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Abstract: River management is a typical example of a complex problem involving a variety of stakeholder
interests and fundamental environmental uncertainties. The Dutch government aims to take the different
interests and views explicitly into account by allowing stakeholders to participate in the planning process. The
aim of our research is to analyse this participatory process to investigate stakeholder support, their influence
on the decision-making process, and the role of norms and co-operation. To this end, we developed an agent
based model representing a negotiation among stakeholders. Stakeholder support for a river management
strategy is modelled on the basis of the Theory of Reasoned Action and a theory of Social and Cognitive
Action. For evaluating the different river engineering alternatives the Agent Based Model is coupled to an
Integrated River Model that describes possible long-term impacts (e.g. flood risk, nature development) of
river engineering options. We show how the coupled model framework can aid to analyse the participatory
planning process of the ongoing Grensmaas project. Also, we assess how the policy outcome might change
when the agents would take climate change into account.
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INTRODUCTION

Agent Based Modelling (ABM) has been
identified as a promising technique for the explicit
representation of stakeholder perspectives in
policy relevant research. Agent based models may
be incorporated into Integrated Assessment
modelling frameworks for a better representation
of stakeholder behaviour in Integrated Assessment
models allowing us to investigate stakeholderenvironment interaction (Rotmans, 2002).
Furthermore, agent based models can be used to
structure participatory processes, stimulating
social learning by sharing viewpoints among
stakeholders (Pahl-Wostl, 2002).
In this paper we apply the approach of ABM to a
case study of river management. We will focus on
the river engineering project ‘Grensmaas’ which is
currently ongoing in the Dutch province of
Limburg. The Grensmaas project was initiated in
1997 to achieve three main goals (Maaswerken,
1998): 1) reduction of flood recurrence to 1:250
years, 2) the development of a minimum of 1000
ha of riparian nature, and 3) the extraction of a
minimum of 35 million tons of gravel for national

use. To this end, measures are planned to widen
the Meuse to the north of the city of Maastricht
over a length of some 40 km.
The Grensmaas project affects many stakeholders
with a variety of interests. The main stakeholder
groups of the Grensmaas project are the
inhabitants of the region, farmers, nature
organizations, and the gravel extracting
companies. It is an explicit aim of the project
organization to involve these stakeholders as
much as possible in the decision-making process
in order to develop an integrated strategy and a
broad societal interest and support.
In this paper we analyse the participatory planning
process of the Grensmaas project. We thereby use
an agent based model to assess stakeholder
support for a river management strategy on the
basis of their goals and beliefs. In the first model
prototype discussed here we assume the cognitive
representation of goals and beliefs to be static. In
future research we will further investigate and
implement mechanisms of adaptive cognition.
With the current prototype we assess optimal
strategies from the perspectives of individual

stakeholders (‘ideal’ strategies), as well as
plausible negotiation outcomes (‘compromises’).
Finally, we show how the negotiation process
could change when all stakeholders would take
climate change into account.
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2.1

A MODEL OF STAKEHOLDER
SUPPORT
Determinants of support

The conceptual model of stakeholder support is
depicted in figure 2.1. It is based upon the wellknown Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen
and Fishbein, 1980) and a theory of Social and
Cognitive action (Conte and Castelfranchi, 1995).
Stakeholder support is determined by three
factors:
Attitude: In the TRA attitude towards a behaviour
is described as ‘the individuals positive or
negative evaluation of performing that behaviour’
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). We interpret this
notion as an evaluation of self-interest goals that
arise from a so-called pre-cognitive objective
relation of interest (Conte and Castelfranchi,
1995). In the case study of the Grensmaas typical
self-interest goals are flood reduction for the
inhabitants, profit for the gravel extracting
companies and so on.
Norm compliance: In correspondence to the
‘subjective norm’ in the TRA we adopt the notion,
norm compliance as a formal evaluation of
normative goals. A normative goal is related to
the agent’s belief that he has a social obligation to
perform (a) specific action(s). According to
(Conte and Castelfranchi, 1995) normative goals
can be issued by a so-called ‘sovereign’ agent. For
our case study typical normative goals are the
primary objectives of the Grensmaas project of
flood recurrence, nature development, and gravel
extraction issued by the ‘sovereign’ policymaker.
Social compliance: Goal adoption can be
considered one of the main mechanisms of
stakeholder interaction (Conte and Castelfranchi,
1995). Therefore we include the notion ‘Social
compliance’ as an evaluation of the agents’
adopted goals.

2.2

Figure 2.1: Determinants of stakeholder support
adopted goals. For this evaluation we assume that
the agents exhibit so-called lexicographic
preferences. Lexicographic preferences imply that
decision evaluations are made on the basis of a
(ordered) set of minimal needs. When these needs
are fulfilled, optimisation may occur on the basis
of other criteria. The methodology has recently
been discussed in the field of environmental
economics (Stern, 1997) and applied, for
example, for a stakeholder evaluation of wetland
recreation (Spash, 2000).
The implementation of the lexicographic
preference structure is shown in figure 2.2.
Agents may express their goal satisfaction on a
scale from –1 (‘unacceptable’) to 0 (‘neutral’) to 1
(‘strongly supported’). Goal satisfaction is
determined on the basis of two types of
quantitative goal standards. Firstly, an agent can
attach a minimal (maximal) requirement, referred
to as a ‘conditional standard’ (CS). When its
expected value for this goal is respectively below
(above) this standard the agent will consider this
goal value to be ‘unacceptable’, corresponding to
lexicographic, non-compensatory behaviour.
Additionally, agents may specify whether the goal
should be optimised. They do so by expressing
two optimisation standards: an optimisation zero
point value OS0 (the goal value for which their
support is ‘neutral’) and a optimisation high value
OSH (the goal value for which their support is
‘high’).
The total support an agent attaches to a river
management strategy is now simply calculated as
the unweighted average of its goal evaluations.
However, when one of its goals is evaluated as
‘unacceptable’ the river management strategy is
considered ‘unacceptable’ (support is set to –1).

Calculating Support

The agents determine their support for a river
management strategy by evaluating the expected
impacts of the river management strategy in
relation to their self-interest, normative, and

2.3

The negotiation outcome

The outcome of the negotiation process is
calculated by maximizing support among

Goal satisfaction
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Figure 2.2: A typical lexicographic goal
evaluation curve that specifies goal satisfaction as
a function of the expected goal value. A goal
evaluation curve is defined on the basis of a
conditional standard CS, and/or optimisation
standards OS0 and OSH.
stakeholders involved. This simple method allows
us to assess 1) what would be ‘ideal’ river
management strategies designed on the basis of
one individual stakeholder perspective, and 2) a
‘compromising’ strategy designed on the basis of
multiple
perspectives.
For
compromising
stakeholders are valued equally with the exception
of the policy-maker and gravel extractor. These
powerful parties must support the river
management strategy (support > 0) for its overall
approval.
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Figure 3.1:The Integrated River Model concept.
Estimating the impacts of river engineering
involves numerous fundamental uncertainties in
relation to climate change, nature development,
and for estimating the monetary costs and benefits
(Valkering et al., 2004) According to (van Asselt,
2000) different legitimate interpretations of these
uncertainties may exist. The agents may thus hold
different perspectives on uncertainty as part of
their subjective belief system. These perspectives
are represented as value settings for uncertain
IRM parameters related to climate change,
hydraulic roughness, and costs and benefits. The
agents feed these settings into the IRM, together
with a set of river engineering measures, to
calculate values for their goal criteria, see figure
3.1. These values form the basis of their outcome
evaluation of the river management strategy
described in the previous section.

THE INTEGRATED RIVER MODEL

For evaluating the different river engineering
alternatives the agents use an Integrated River
Model (IRM). The concept of the IRM is
displayed in figure 3.1. The main input model
variables are different river engineering measures
- that together constitute a river management
strategy. The main output variables are the longterm impacts with respect to flooding, nature, and
agriculture as well as short-term costs and benefits
(e.g. monetary costs, gravel extraction, and
hindrance) associated with river engineering.
The model was implemented for a river crosssection representing the river Meuse at the
location ‘Borgharen’. The modules are based on
basic principles of hydrology, hydraulics,
groundwater dynamics, and nature development
and are partially based upon existing expert
modules (for example to assess flood and
agricultural damage). The model was conceptually
validated with experts from the Grensmaas project
organisation, and partially numerically calibrated
and validated with respect to their model results.
For a detailed model description, see (Valkering
et al., 2004).

Figure 3.1: The interface between the Agent
Based and Integrated River Model
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STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES

In the previous sections we have developed a
framework
for
structuring
stakeholder
perspectives in terms of goals, quantitative goal
standards, and perspectives on uncertainty. In this
section we apply this framework for a preliminary
assessment of stakeholder perspectives. The
information was obtained from a series of
stakeholder interviews, available governmental
Environmental Assessment reports of proposed

Agent
Policymaker

Citizen

Nature org.

Farmer

Gravel extractor

Goal
flood recurrence (yrs)
nature area (ha)
ecosystem diversity (-)
loss agricultural area (ha)
∆ groundwater level (m)
hindrance (person*years)
gravel extraction (*10^6 tons)
profitability (%)
flood recurrence (yrs)
hindrance (person*years)
nature area (ha)
ecosystem diversity (-)
nature area (ha)
ecosystem diversity (-)
∆ groundwater level (m)
flood recurrence (yrs)
loss agricultural area (ha)
∆ groundwater level (m)
gravel extraction (*10^6 tons)
profitability (%)

Type

Direction

N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
SI
SI
SI
SI
SI
SI
SI
SI
SI
SI
SI
SI

min
min
min
max
min
max
min
min
min
max
min
min
min
min
min
min
max
min
min
min

Conditional
Standard
250
1000
0.7
35
4
250
30000
1000
0.7
1000
0.7
-0.2
250
1000
-0.2
4

Optimization zero
point value
0.7
1000
0
20000
20000
0.7
0.7
0
0
0
35
-

Optimization
high value
1
2000
-0.2
30000
30000
1
1
-0.2
1000
-0.2
70
-

Table 4.1: Stakeholders’ goals and conditional and optimisation goal standards. The goal standards
determine the evaluation curve an agent uses to evaluate its goal, see figure 2.2. The goal ‘type’ indicates
whether the goal is considered self interested (SI), normative (N) or adopted (A). The ‘direction’ indicates
whether the standards refer to minimal or maximal requirements.

river management alternatives (Maaswerken,
1998), (Maaswerken, 2003), and on the official
stakeholder commentaries to these reports. The
description of the methodology for perspective
elicitation is necessarily brief. A more elaborate
description can be found in (Valkering et al.,
2004).
The main stakeholders of the Grensmaas project
are represented by the corresponding agents
‘policymaker’,
‘citizen’,
‘farmer’,
‘nature
organization’, and ‘gravel extractor’. The
stakeholders’ goals and goal standards are
presented in table 4.1. The policymaker is
considered to be a sovereign agent issuing the
norms of flood reduction, nature development, and
gravel extraction in correspondence with the main
objectives of the Grensmaas project. The negative
side effects (loss of agricultural area, groundwater
level decrease, and hindrance) are to be minimized
(Maaswerken, 1998). The policymaker also issues
the norm of profitability, since it requires the
monetary costs of river engineering to be fully
covered by the benefits of extracted gravel. The
non-governmental stakeholders hold various selfinterest goals as presented in table 4.1.
The adopted stakeholders’ uncertainty perspectives
are displayed in table 4.2. We assume that, in
order to avoid risk, stakeholders adopt an
uncertainty perspective that minimizes their goal
fulfilment. The citizen, for example, claims that a
high estimate of climate change has to be taken
into account in the estimation of the safety level.

Uncertainty Climate
Stakeholder
change
No
Policymaker
High
Citizen
No
Nature organization
No
Farmer
No
Gravel extractor

Hydraulic Costs and
roughness benefits
Central
Central
High
Central
Central
Central
Low
Central
Central
Negative

Table 4.2: Assumed stakeholder perspectives on
uncertainty
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SIMULATION RESULTS

In this section we present an overview of some
simulation results. In particular, we will construct
optimal river engineering strategies for different
boundary conditions. To this end, a river
management strategy is represented as a set of river
engineering parameters: main channel deepening
(MC deepening), main channel broadening (MC
broadening),
floodplain
excavation
(FP
excavation), surface elevation of the clay shield
(CS level), and additional nature area (Add.
nature). For simulating a river management
strategy the parameters are varied within
predefined ranges in order to maximize total agent
support.
In table 5.1 the following simulated river
management strategies are displayed: ‘Ideal’
strategies maximizing support for each individual
agent, and a ‘compromising’ strategy maximizing
total support (see section 2.3). These optimal
strategies are constructed on the basis of the

stakeholder perspectives presented in section 4.
The compromising strategy corresponds well with
currently preferred river engineering alternative of
(Maaswerken, 2003), see (Valkering et al., 2004).
MC deepening (m)
MC broadening (m)
FP excavation (m)
CS surface (m)
Add. nature (m)

cit
1
100
125
0
250

ge
2
200
500
4
0

pm
-2
50
250
0
375

no
-2
50
375
0
125

farm
-2
0
250
4
0

comp
0
100
125
4
250

Table 5.1: Calculated ‘ideal’ river management
strategies for the agents citizen (cit), gravel
extractor (ge), policy-maker (pm), nature
organisation (no) and farmer (farm), and the
‘compromising’ strategy (comp).

valued high only by themselves and are considered
unacceptable by the rest.
For the farmer the disagreement is related to
conflicting goals. Its interest of agricultural land
and proper groundwater conditions inherently
conflict with the approach of river widening and
nature development. For the gravel extractor,
however, the disagreement results from a
difference in uncertainty perspective with respect
to the expected costs and benefits of the river
engineering measures (see table 4.2).
a)
Ideal strategy:

policymaker
1

policymaker
citizen
nature org.

5.1

-1

gravel extr.

The ‘compromising’ river engineering alternative
can be characterized as, indeed, a compromise
between the different stakeholders, but within the
normative boundary conditions of safety, nature
area and profitability set by the government. This
is illustrated in figure 5.1, which shows calculated
stakeholder support for the ‘compromising’
alternative. The goal evaluations for safety, nature
area, gravel extraction, and profitability are equal
to 1, indicating that the main project objectives are
fulfilled. However, other criteria are valued
negatively. In particular the farmer strongly objects
to the expected loss of agricultural area and change
in groundwater level.

citizen

-2

farmer

nature org.

b)
Ideal strategy:
farmer
gravel extr.
gravel extr.

policymaker

1
0
-1

citizen

-2
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A short analysis the Grensmaas project
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nature org.

no
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ge

-1

Figure 5.2: Calculated stakeholder support for the
‘ideal’ river management alternatives.

-1.5

Figure 5.1: Calculated goal satisfactions and
stakeholder support for the ‘compromising’
alternative.
The analysis of the ‘ideal’ strategies shows that the
mutual agreement among the policy-maker, citizen
and nature organization is large. Each one of their
respective ideal strategies is valued relatively high
among this group (see figure 5.2 a) ) indicating
common interests and win-win. The farmer and
gravel extractor, on the other hand, generally
disagree with the other parties, as illustrated in
figure 5.3 b). Their respective ideal strategies are

5.2

The case of climate change

The modelling framework allows us to assess how
the negotiation process may change under
changing boundary conditions. Consider, for
example, the case of climate change. Climate
change is currently considered an important issue
for long-term water management in the
Netherlands. It may lead to increasing peak
discharges by some 20%.
The new ‘compromising’ strategy simulated for
conditions of climate change contains large-scale
riverbed broadening, in combination with raising
the main channel riverbed. This would allow
society to maintain current safety standards whilst

mitigating decreases in the groundwater level, see
figure 5.3. In this scenario the citizen would
strongly object to the river engineering strategy,
because of excessive hindrance levels, but he
would be largely ignored.
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participatory approach would thus be vital for a
better understanding of the mechanism of cognition
change. Eventually, we hope that the application of
this model concept will induce social learning and
the consideration of multiple perspectives in
decision-making. This would be a small step
further towards truly collaborative and sustainable
river management.

no
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CONCLUSION

In this paper we have presented an Agent Based
Model that describes stakeholder support and the
outcome of a negotiation process among
stakeholders of river management. The type of
model that we developed must not be considered a
‘truth machine’ that predicts policymaking for river
management. It rather provides a framework for a
‘what-if’ analysis. Given the goals and beliefs of
stakeholders, the model calculates which river
management strategy receives the maximal total
support of the stakeholders.
We showed how the ABM can be used to analyse
stakeholder perspectives and identify conflicting
goals and mutual benefits among stakeholders.
Also, the model can aid to reflect upon possible
changes in the negotiation process (i.e. problems
that are likely to emerge) as a result of uncertain
future developments. The current model version is
a ‘stepping stone’ for investigating
In future research we intend to implement
mechanisms of goal adoption/rejection and belief
change in the model framework, in correspondence
with the notions of adaptive cognition and social
learning, in order to study the interactions between
the social system and river environment.
The current prototype is particularly suitable as a
communication tool for application within
participatory stakeholder processes. Using this
model would encourage stakeholders to reflect
upon their goals in a social context. When
conflicting goals are revealed stakeholders may
reconsider their goals and adopted standards. A
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